World Development Report 2023 on Migrants, Refugees and Societies: A discussion

On 12th June 2023 in Sapienza the World Bank launched in Italy the World Development Report 2023.This year the topic is on a challenging and politically sensitive topic such as migrants, refugees and societies. The first sentence of the foreword of the Report reads as follows: “The WDRs, are essential sources of knowledge and data for the global community on key development issues.”. In this respect, we can say: mission accomplished! This report is a remarkable flagship document that effectively summarizes the current state of the discussion on a complex and multidisciplinary topic like migration, proposing a comprehensive framework for policymaking in the field. However, there are some important issues that deserve highlighting.

The core analytical tool of this WDR is the Match-Motive Framework

While the framework offers a comprehensive range of heterogeneous situations and their policy implications, it primarily employs labor economics and international law as key lenses to comprehend migration patterns effectively. This approach runs the risk of obscuring a broader perspective that is essential for a comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of migration patterns, as well as the development of appropriate migration policies. As explicitly mentioned in the report, the decision to migrate is a complex one influenced by various push and pull factors (e.g., development patterns at the origins, international mitigation policies and local adaptation to climate change; the role of wealth and liquidity constraints, evolving aspirations of middle income countries, demographic patterns, diasporas and migration chains, structural transformation at the destination due to the availability of additional cheap labor).  Let me just provide two examples of concrete situations outside the Match-Motive Framework: i) latest WB projections indicate that more than 210 million people will be forced to migrate by 2050 due to climate change. Their actual numbers will depend on  the global and national policies for mitigation as well as the adaptation tools available and adopted and implemented by the most vulnerable groups. How can we incorporate climate refugees and those policies into this framework?  this is not entirely clear to me; ii) in the stark reality the distinction between refugees and economic migrants blurs. According to estimates from the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA), only 9% of the total inflow of refugees to the EU in 2021 was driven by “forced reasons”. Hence, a simplistic binary picture with individuals either falling into the categories of refugees or non-refugees failed to accurately capture the complex reality of the situation. As I said while the framework provides a range of heterogeneous situations and is effective in identifying a wide set of policy recommendations, it is still not sufficiently broad to encompass all the relevant issues that are important for policymaking in this complex subject.

Policy options

We concur with the authors of the WDR23 that current approaches often fail to ensure that both migrants and nationals benefit from mobility. This leads to significant inefficiencies and missed opportunities in both destination and origin countries. The report presents alternative policy options grounded on the match and motive framework. While it is widely agreed that expanding legal pathways for labor mobility is the optimal solution when the match between migrants and destination countries is strong, there is increasing recognition that hybrid solutions are necessary when the match is weak but motivations are strong, particularly in the case of the integration of asylum seekers (such as labor corridors, temporary pathways, community sponsorship programs, etc.). Good practices and experiences in implementing complementary pathways and community sponsorship can be observed in Australia, Canada, the UK, and the U.S, and also in Italy (see, for instance, the Caritas project “EUPassworld”). However, it is important to acknowledge that this argument may undermine the significance of “structural transformation” at the destination, due to the availability of additional cheap labor.

The role of inclusive decision-making and the “Rome Dialogue”

As emphasized in the report, to expand the number of alternative legal pathways inclusive decision-making involving the private sector, civil society, workers’ organizations, local authorities, and other stakeholders is crucial. Collaboration among all parties is necessary to establish a supportive environment that encompasses technical, legal, and operational aspects for the design and implementation of community sponsorship pilot projects. This collaboration also extends to actions related to developing agreements with the authorities responsible in Member States, facilitating the selection of beneficiaries based on their talents, skills, and aspirations (e.g., talent partnerships), and facilitating the preparation, transfer, hosting, and integration measures for third-country nationals upon their arrival and beyond. All this is not straightforward, it is not common practice yet and has a cost. A concrete contribution to foster this collaboration and promote an open exchange for reaching practical, evidence-based solutions to these issues, has been proposed by the so-called “Rome Dialogue”. This dialogue platform, created by the World Bank’s Rome Jobs and Labor Mobility Center and the Italian Center for International Development (a consortium of the three Rome State Universities), aims to facilitate constructive discussions among various stakeholders involved in migration pathways. Its objective is to contribute to the identification of optimal options building up an agenda for positive change.

We need rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of such initiatives and better data.

However, empirical evidence on alternative pathways to manage asylum-seeking flows is currently limited. The existing focus has primarily been on assessing the effectiveness of various measures aimed at promoting the integration of refugees and non-forced (economic) migrants. According to the EU labor force survey (2016), approximately 1 in 5 economically active refugees is unemployed, with 1 in 8 experiencing long-term unemployment of over a year.[1] These statistics also reveal that, on average, it takes refugees up to 20 years to attain employment rates similar to those of the native-born population, except for the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. The employment of refugees increases in subsequent years at different rates across countries. In some countries, such as Sweden and Canada, refugees appear to mostly close the employment gap with other immigrants after a decade in the country, while in others such as Norway and Finland, the gap remains large and stable over time.[2]  Notably, entrepreneurial activity has emerged as one of the most common occupations for refugees within the European Union. To this aim, as highlighted in the report, additional and improved data are needed, aligning with the primary objective of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, which aims to enhance data collection and utilization for evidence-based policymaking. In this regard, despite certain recognized limitations, household surveys, particularly multipurpose household surveys, offer significant potential in analytically addressing complex and multidimensional phenomena that require data on various livelihood dimensions over extended periods.[3] Moreover, when georeferencing is utilized, integration with other data sources becomes possible, enabling even greater accuracy and granularity at a lower level of granularity.[4]

Conclusive remarks on recommendations

If the positive effects of migration outweigh the negative effects, as clearly emerges in the WDR23, why are there widespread barriers to migration? Is it an “irrational behavior”? Perhaps we need to broaden the perspective from pure economic and demographic issues and consider the political economy aspect. As Clemens wisely argued some years ago: if the median voter at the destination lacks capital and/or sufficient qualifications, they may feel more vulnerable to competition from migrants. Consequently, policymakers, driven by the desire to maximize re-election chances, may find it advantageous to promote anti-migration policies.[5] Furthermore, negative externalities, such as the potential reduction of public spaces, competition for public services and the welfare state, and diminished cultural homogeneity, could play a significant role in shaping perceptions and attitudes towards migration of the native populations at the destination. If we aim to present a concrete agenda for policy change, we must take these additional considerations into account within our interpretative framework.

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[1] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/87a8f92d-9aa8-11e6-868c-01aa75ed71a1

[2] Brell, C., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2020). The labor market integration of refugee migrants in high-income countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34(1), 94-121.

[3] Letta Marco, Montalbano Pierluigi, Paolantonio Adriana (2022). Leveraging household surveys to boost research on climate migration, published on Let’s Talk Development, World Bank Blogs;

[4] United Nations Statistical Commission, 2021.

[5] Clemens, M. A. (2011). Economics and emigration: Trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk?. Journal of Economic perspectives, 25(3), 83-106.